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ABSTRACT 
 
There have been no empirical attempts to estimate and verify the dividend-earnings relation 
reflecting both the signaling and dividend smoothing hypotheses. This study proposed a 
cointegration model to test both hypotheses in an integrated framework in order to provide better 
insight into the dividend and earning relation. We are particularly interested in the issue of 
whether the model can detect a presence of inter-temporal relations between dividends and 
earnings. The implications of the signaling model and smoothing model of dividends were 
empirically tested using the recent 26 annual series data of dividends and earnings up to year 
2006 for 226 firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. The results of t-test and logistic regression 
show that the presence of cointegration is positively related to the degree of information 
asymmetry, a result consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis. In addition, dividend 
smoothing is identified as an underlying force to make dividends and earnings cointegrated.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n the signaling model of dividend, a firm's dividend policy is hypothesized to convey the information 
about its future prospects that is privately observed only by insiders. John and Williams (1985) have 
demonstrated how dividends can act as a credible signal of the fundamental earnings prospects of the 
firm. In practice, for dividends to be a credible signal, insider should maintain a systematic relationship between 
expected earnings and dividends. In this regard, Lintner (1956) found that managers smoothly adjust firms’ 
dividends with respect to earnings and maintain a long-run target payout ratio. Lintner’s further investigations show 
that most firms follow a partial adaptation process making a gradual dividend adjustment to the target ratio if current 
payout is deviated from the target ratio. Both the dividend smoothing and the dividend signaling hypotheses have 
been confirmed by a number of subsequent studies. Whereas dividend smoothing and dividend signaling are 
well-established empirical facts, the empirical evidences are based principally on information collected in the US 
market. The dividend policies of corporations differ significantly across countries due to a variety of institutional 
and financial market differences.1 The principal objective of this study is to assess the dividend policies of firms in 
Korea. In particular, this study investigates whether Korean firms follow dividend policies as in developed markets 
in which dividend smoothing and dividend signaling become stylized facts. 
 
A common problem for the researchers studying the dividend signaling hypothesis and the dividend 
smoothing hypothesis is that most of the studies tend to focus on the signaling model of dividend (e.g. dividend 
announcement studies) or the smoothing model of dividend separately (e.g. partial adjustment models), but not both. 
There have been no empirical attempts to estimate and verify the dividend-earnings relation reflecting both 
hypotheses. Existing empirical tests cannot really identify the types of mechanisms for the dividend-earnings 
relation (e.g. the joint considerations of signaling and dividend smoothing). In this study, I propose a cointegration 
                                                 
1 Aivazian et al (2003) find that empirical dividend policy equations of emerging market firms are structurally different from 
those of US firms .  
I 
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model to test both hypotheses in an integrated framework in order to provide better insight into the dividend and 
earning relation. This allows us to investigate not only the informational content of dividend but also the underlying 
factor to make dividend signal to be credible.  
 
The objective of this paper is two fold. First, we test the informational content of dividend. For this purpose, 
I construct a model to show the predictive relations among dividends and future earnings at the firm level. This 
paper is particularly interested in the issue of whether the model can detect a presence of inter-temporal relations 
between dividends and earnings. Second, I test the dividend smoothing hypothesis using a non-linear framework 
involving dividends and earnings stream. Tests of the time-series implications of dividend models in a cointegrating 
framework offer a distinctive approach to examine the ability of each hypothesis to explain corporate dividend 
behavior and hence, identify the types of mechanisms for the dividend-earnings relation. The most significant use of 
the cointegration model is that this model is able to identify the long-term equilibrium relationship between 
dividends and earnings.  Because theoretical analysis specifies the long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
earnings and dividend time series in the presence of information asymmetry, the cointegration model employed in 
this study is regarded as a more direct test of the theoretical arguments in this area.  Also a test is performed to 
examine the relationship between this derived dividend-setting behavior of a firm and the information environment 
using both multivariate and univariate techniques. The evidence shows that dividend-earnings relation depends on 
the degree of information asymmetry and dividend smoothing is an underlying factor to maintain a long-term 
equilibrium relationship between dividends and earnings. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II lays out the basic model.  Section III describes the data and the methodology employed in this study.  
Section IV reports the empirical results.  Section V summarizes and concludes the study and offers suggestions for 
future research. 
 
MODEL 
 
Description Of Dividend Payout Pattern 
 
Assume that the dividend payout at time t can be described as follows. 
 
DPSt = P*(E[EPSt+1| Mt,It])
ß                                  (1) 
 
and EPSt+1= EPStZtVt+1, Zt  ε It, and EPSt ε Mt.           (2) 
 
where DPSt is dividend per share, EPSt is earning per share, Mt is a public information set, It is an insider's 
information set at time t, E is the expectation operator, Zt is a signal of the firm's t+1 earnings observed at time t, 
Vt+1 is an innovation term with mean 1, which is independent of both public and private information at time t, and 
P can be interpreted as a dividend payout ratio when β = 1. Equation (1) and (2) imply that dividends are based on 
the earnings observable only to insiders conditioned on the true quality of a firm.  If a firm maintains a constant 
dividend payout ratio, then β is equal to one.  Β less than one indicates that dividends are a concave function of 
expected future earnings conditioned on the insider's private information thereby implying dividend smoothing.2 
Substituting (2) into (1) implies that  
 
DPSt = P*(E[EPStZtVt+1| Mt,It])
 ß  (3) 
 
                                                 
2This model is similar to that of the John and Williams (1985) in the sense that the unknown attribute is the expected earnings.  
Miller and Rock (1985) use the current earnings as the unknown attribute.  However, the conflict between John and Williams 
(1985) and Miller and Rock is resolved in this paper.  In terms of empirical setting, this study allows the dividend signal error for 
the current earnings (i.e., in equation (5)), assuming that the current earnings are the biased estimator of the expected earnings (i.e., 
equation (2)). is used to consider the degree of dividend smoothing.   
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Because EPSt and Zt are measurable with respect to management's time t information which is the joint of 
the public information (Mt) and their private signal (Zt),  
 
E[EPStZtVt+1| Mt,It] = EPStZtE[Vt+1| Mt,It]   
 
Because the random innovation term is independent of Mt and It and has mean 0, E[Vt+1| Mt,It] = 1.  
Hence we can express (3) as    
 
DPSt = P*(EPStZt)
 ß  (4) 
 
The degree of smoothing can be measured by the curvature of equation (4).  For a curve DPSt = 
P*(EPStZt)
 ß, the curvature is given by (1-ß)/EPSt.  ß can be estimated by taking the natural log of equation (4) to 
yield the following testable relationship 
 
lnDPSt =ɑ + ß lnEPSt + εt                     (5) 
   
where εt = ß ln(Zt) and ɑ= ln(P). Equation (5) will be used for finding the equilibrium relationship between 
dividends and earnings.  
 
Identification Of Equilibrium Relationship Between Earnings And Dividends - Cointegration 
 
According to the dividend signaling hypothesis, if dividends continue to separate from expected earnings in 
the long-run, then there will be a force which begins to bring them together again to maintain a long-term 
equilibrium relationship between dividends and earnings. The dividend smoothing hypothesis suggests that this 
underlying force is the manager’s behavior to pay smoothed dividend with respect to earnings. In econometric sense, 
if there exists a long-term equilibrium relationship between dividends and earnings (in fact, an equilibrium 
relationship between natural log of dividends and natural log of earnings in equation (5)), then the deviations from 
this relationship, εt in equation (5) will follow a stationary process even though dividends and earnings follow 
non-stationary process.  The idea of finding the long-run equilibrium relationship was captured in cointegration 
developed by Engle and Granger (1987). Cointegration implies that deviations from equilibrium are stationary, with 
finite variance, even though the series themselves are nonstationary and have infinite variance.  Engle and Granger 
show that the existence of a stationary process for the combination of variables in a system implies the presence of a 
long run equilibrium relationship among variables.   
 
Test Of Cointegration 
 
As a general rule, nonstationary time series variables should not be used in regression models, in order to 
avoid the problem of spurious regression.  There is an exception to this rule.  If lnDPSt and lnEPSt are 
nonstationary I(1) variables, then we would expect that their difference, or any linear combination of them, such as 
εt = lnDPSt - ɑ - ß lnEPSt, to be I(1) as well.  However there are important cases when εt = lnDPSt - ɑ - ß lnEPSt is 
a stationary I(0) process. In this case lnDPSt and lnEPSt are said to be cointegrated.  Cointegration implies that 
lnDPSt and lnEPSt share similar stochastic trends, and they never diverge too far from each other since their 
difference εt is stationary,. The cointegrated variables lnDPSt and lnEPSt exhibit a long term equilibrium 
relationship defined by lnDPSt = ɑ + ß lnEPSt + εt, and εt is the equilibrium error, which represents short term 
deviations from the long-term relationship. ß, cointegrating vector is regarded as an underlying force to make 
lnDPSt and lnEPSt to maintain a long term equilibrium relationship. In this study, Johansen (1988) cointegration test 
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is used to identify cointegrating relationship among the variables. Johansen (1988) proposed two tests statistics to 
determine the cointegration rank, which are trace statistic and maximum eigenvalue statistic.3  
 
DATA  
 
Sample Selection And Data Collection 
 
We select a sample of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange over the 26-year period from 1981 to 2006. 
The following sample selection criteria were employed: 
 
(i)  Firms had to have at least 15 years of earnings and dividend data during the period 1980-2006, as reported 
in the Korea Listed Companies Association database.  
 
(ii)  When estimating Eq. (1), all firms with non-positive EPS or zero dividends were eliminated from the 
sample, in order to prevent the spurious results of dividend smoothing.4 
 
(iii)  A further screen excluded firms with less than 15 observations for each firm characteristic variable used in 
the regression. From a total of 732 firms, 226 firms fulfilled these screening criteria. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. From this table, the following remarks are found: 
 
 
<Table 1> Sample Statistics 
Variable* 
Mean 
(n=226) 
Standard Deviation Min Max 
DE 0.4081 0.2228 0.0893 1.7382 
SEPS 2424.0 2187.5 217.5 19656.2 
SDPS 354.5578 262.2872 97.6155 2067.0100 
EPS 2260.3300 1544.5800 268.6437 8507.9900 
DPS 468.9158 223.8762 89.0771 1606.9200 
LOGD 5.6286 0.5531 3.8466 7.0639 
LOGE 6.9426 0.6145 4.9195 8.4472 
* Dividend payout ratio (DE) is measured by dividends per share divided by earnings per share. Earnings variability (SEPS) is 
measured using the standard deviation of earnings per share over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the 
twenty-six years. Dividends variability (SDPS) is measured using the standard deviation of dividends per share over a minimum 
of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty-six years. DPS is dividends per share and EPS is earnings per share. 
LOGD and LOGE stand for natural logs dividends and earnings, respectively. 
 
 
With regard to average dividend payments, Korean firms paid 468 KRW (or 0.40 USD) per share. The average 
dividend payout ratio is 40.8%, which is lower than that of US firms.5  The lower observed payout ratio in Korea 
may be attributable to the different tax treatment of dividend income tax relative to the capital gains tax. Korean 
firms appear to have less incentive to pay dividends, as the unfavorable tax treatment of dividend income over 
                                                 
3 In this paper, we employed both tests and found that there is no difference between the trace and the maximum eigenvalue tests in 
detecting cointegrating relationship. The presented result in this paper is based on the maximum eigenvalue test. Before running the 
cointegration test, stationary tests of the underlying variables are performed by using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. We 
found both natural log of dividends and earnings are non-stationary at the individual firm level.  
4 The exclusion of firms with negative earnings and zero dividends has the advantage of eliminating "spurious dividend 
smoothing." This spurious dividend smoothing arises naturally, rather than being the result of the conscious management of 
dividend policy. Dividend smoothing implies a deliberate effort on the part of managers to adjust dividend payments in response to 
variations in the earnings stream. 
5  Average dividend payout ratio from 1930’s to 2000s is 54.3% for S&P 500 companies. 
(http://www.barra.com/Research/Fundamentals.aspx)   
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capital gain is more serious than is the case in the US.6 In addition, many investors in Korea disregard dividends 
and consider stock price appreciation as the principal component of stock returns. Korean investor’s attitude toward 
dividends may also contribute to lower dividend payout ratios. Dividends variability (SDPS) is 354.55 while 
earnings variability (SEPS) is 2260.33. Earnings variability is approximately 7 times higher than dividends 
variability, implying the presence of dividend smoothing.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To test whether earnings and dividends are cointegrated, we run equation (5). For cointegration test, 166 
firms (73.5% of the total sample) fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration while 60 firms (26.5% of the 
total sample) reject the null, concluding cointegration. Summary statistics for equation (5) cointegrating firms are 
provided in Table 2. Average values for β and R-squared for cointegrating firms are 0.258 and 61.11%, respectively.  
 
 
<Table 2> Summary Statistics for Equation (5) 
Variable* 
Mean 
(n=60) 
Standard Deviation Min Max 
 0.6258 0.0.1832 0.1485 0.9367 
R-squared 0.6111 0.2415 0.01172 0.9452 
*β is the coefficient of ln(EPS) in equation (5). 1-β measures degree of dividend smoothing. R-squared is the explanatory power 
of the model.  
 
 
The dividend signaling hypothesis suggests that there will be a long-term equilibrium relationship between 
dividend changes and earning changes. Therefore, if there is a deviation from the contemporaneous relationship 
between earning and dividends, there will be an underlying force to make them to return to the equilibrium 
relationship. According to the dividend smoothing hypothesis, this underlying force will be a dividend smoothing. 
This line of reasoning suggests that cointegrating vector in equation (5) should be less than one if earnings and 
dividends are cointegrated. Table 2 shows that the average magnitude of the coefficient estimator, β, is 0.6258, 
indicating that the degree of dividend smoothing plays an important role to induce firms to maintain a systematic 
dividend payout policy. . Average explanatory power of the model is 61.11%. It indicates that dividend movements 
are reasonably well represented by earnings movements.7 The results of Table 2 support the dividend smoothing 
hypothesis. 
 
We further investigate to explain the cross-sectional properties of cointegrating firms and noncointegrating 
firms implied by the dividend signaling hypothesis. The dividend signaling hypothesis suggests that the higher 
degree of information asymmetry is more likely to induce firms to maintain a long-term equilibrium relationship 
between dividends and earnings. To describe a firm’s informational environments, we use listing years and firm size 
as proxies for the information environment. A firm with an older history on an organized stock exchange is expected 
to generate more public information for the general market investor. Thus, the problem of information asymmetry 
will be less serious for a firm with a longer listing year. Size can also be used as a proxy for a firm’s informational 
environments. Freeman (1987) and Kross and Schroeder (1988) reported that the market prices of large firms 
reflected earnings more accurately than those of small firms. Thus, it is possible that smaller firms may have a 
greater proclivity to use dividends as a signal of value. In fact, Eddy and Seifert (1988) reported that the information 
content of a dividend change was greater for smaller firms than for large firms. All of these considerations imply 
that size is likely to reduce signaling needs of dividends. Firm size (SIZE) is estimated by the natural logarithm of 
average total assets, and listing years (HISTORY) is measured by the number of years listed during the sample 
period. Table 3 reports the result of the T-test for the difference in group means between cointegrating firms and 
noncointegrating firms. The T-test for mean differences shows that HISTORY and SIZE of cointegrating firms are 
significantly less than those of noncointegrating firms. This result seems to indicate that less-known firms have more 
                                                 
6 There is no capital gain tax on listed stocks in Korea while 16.5% of tax is applied to the dividend income. 
7 Regression results for noncointegrating firms are not reported since the regression is “spurious regression” if earnings and 
dividends are not cointegrated.  
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motivation to have earnings and dividends cointegrated than well-known firms, supporting the dividend signaling 
hypothesis.    
 
 
<Table 3> Mean Differences of Informative Variables Between Cointegrating firms and Noncointegrating Firms 
 Cointegrating Firms Noncointegrating Firms T-statistics for Mean 
Differences 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.  
SIZE 18.4331 0.8799 19.0063 1.1919 -3.4 (P-value=0.0008)*** 
HISTORY 19.1667 2.8946 20.8072 3.1487 -3.5(P-value=0.0003)*** 
* Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Firm size (SIZE) is estimated by the 
natural logarithm of average total assets during the sample period. Listing years (HISTORY) is measured by the number of years 
listed during the sample period. 
 
 
Logistic Regression Result 
 
We test the relationship between the information environment and the firm's dividend payout policy using 
the logistic regression analysis.  Based on the dividend signaling hypothesis, cointegrating firms are hypothesized 
to face a greater degree of information asymmetry than noncointegrating firms. I assign one to the cointegrating 
firms, and zero to noncointegrating firms.  The logistic estimation procedure is then a maximum likelihood 
estimate of the probability of being the cointegrating firms conditioned on the informative variables. The result is 
reported in Table 4.  SIZE and HISTORY have a significantly negative relationship with the probability of being 
cointegrating firms. The result implies that younger and smaller firms have a tendency to have a cointegrating 
relationship between earnings and dividends.   
 
 
<Table 4> Result of Logistic Regression by Using Informative Variables as Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable ; Transformed Probability of Being Cointegrating firm 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Chi-square 
Intercept 10.6711 10.9376*** 
SIZE -0.4628 7.3114*** 
HITORY -0.1523 7.7032*** 
Chi-square = 20.90***  
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Firm size (SIZE) is estimated by  
the natural logarithm of average total assets during the sample period. Listing years (HISTORY) is measured by the number of 
years listed during the sample period.  
 
 
Robustness Check –Other Considerations 
 
We check the robustness of the results shown in Table4 by considering other important firm characteristic 
variables which are known to influence the firm’s dividend payout policy. For instance, signaling theory implies that 
firms with growth opportunities are more likely to pay dividends to convey this information to the market. At the 
same time, these firms will also have a greater need to retain a higher proportion of earnings to support their 
valuable investment projects. An implication of this combination of requirements is that high growth firms are likely 
to be more sensitive to the tradeoff between dividend signaling needs and dividend signaling costs, whereas low 
growth firms will be much less sensitive to the tradeoff because they would not wish to use costly signals. 
Ownership structure can also influences dividend policy (i.e., Gomes (2000) and La Porta et al. (2000)). For closely 
held firms, the immediate change in fundamental value is less visible and, thus, potentially less important for the 
dividend decision-making process. In fact, Brav et al. (2005) reported that closely held firms regarded the 
consequences of dividend cuts and omissions to be less serious.  They demonstrated that closely held firms were 
more likely to pay dividends in response to temporary changes in earnings than were firms with diffused ownership. 
Financial slack can also be considered to be a potentially important factor in dividend payout decision. The presence 
of financial slack will, in theory, reduce external financing requirements and thus solve the "underinvestment" 
problem, thereby reducing the signaling needs of firms (i.e., Myers and Majluf (1984) and John and Williams 
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(1985)). The effect of leverage on dividend payments is also well known. Higgins (1972) and McCabe (1979) 
suggested that new long-term debt has a negative influence on the amount of dividends paid. Rozeff (1982) reports 
that firms with higher financial leverage pay lower dividends in order to avoid the costs of external finance. Finally, 
the results from earnings volatilities studies have emphasized the relationship between risk and the incentive to pay 
stable dividends, as high earning volatilities have been shown to be associated with lower than expected future 
profitability and future stock returns ( Chaney and Lewis (1995). To consider the potential effect of these important 
determinants of dividend policy, we extend the logistic regression analysis employed in Table 5 by including firm’s 
risk, ownership structure, leverage, growth and slack as control variables. The result is shown Table 5. The results 
show that information variables have expected signs while the other control variables except risk have insignificant 
coefficients. Risk (SEPS) has a significantly positive sign implying that firms with a higher risk is more likely to 
maintain a cointegrating relationship between dividends and earnings. Overall results support the dividend signaling 
hypothesis.   
 
 
<Table 5> Result of Logistic Regression by including control variables 
Dependent Variable ; Transformed Probability of Being cointegrating firm 
Explanatory Variable Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr 
Intercept 11.131 4.1136 7.322 0.0068*** 
SIZE -0.4863 0.2313 4.4195 0.0355** 
HISTORY -0.1562 0.0589 7.0407 0.008*** 
SLACK -4.0825 2.3871 2.9249 0.0872 
GROWTH -1.2242 2.1679 0.3189 0.5723 
LEV -0.1817 0.2222 0.6686 0.4135 
SEPS 0.2363 0.0911 6.7234 0.0095*** 
LARGE 0.0234 0.0158 2.189 0.139 
Chi-square = 31.87*** 
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Firm size (SIZE) is estimated by the natural logarithm of total assets, growth rate (GROWTH) is the average growth rate of size 
over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty six years, financial slack (SLACK) is the ratio of 
accumulated retained earnings to total assets, and earnings variability (SEPS) is measured using the standard deviation of 
earnings per share over a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006 and a maximum of the twenty-six years. Listing years (HISTORY) 
is measured by the number of years listed during the sample period. The percentage of the stock held by the largest shareholders 
(LARGE) is used as a proxy for the concentration of controlling shareholders. Leverage ratio (LEV) is measure by the mean 
leverage ratio (total liabilities divided by total assets) for a minimum of 15 years prior to 2006.   
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
There have been no empirical attempts to estimate and verify the dividend-earnings relation reflecting both 
the signaling and dividend smoothing hypotheses. This study proposed a cointegration model to test both hypotheses 
in an integrated framework in order to provide better insight into the dividend and earning relation.  Specifically, 
this study pursued the following two objectives:  
 
(1)  What is the characterization of the optimal dividend payout patterns on the individual firm basis;  
(2)  What is the effect of information on the firm's dividend payout policy. 
 
The implications of the signaling model and smoothing model of dividends were empirically tested using 
the recent 26 annual series data of dividends and earnings up to year 2006 for 226 firms.  The firms with long-term 
equilibrium relationship between earnings and dividends are identified through a cointegration test and 
cross-sectional properties of these firms are investigated. The results show that the presence of cointegration is 
positively related to the degree of information asymmetry, a result consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis. 
In addition, dividend smoothing is identified as an underlying force to make dividends and earnings cointegrated. To 
ensure the robustness of the empirical results, several firm characteristic variables are added in the logistic 
regression analysis. The results are virtually unchanged.   
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